References & Further Reading

SMU Cox Corporate Governance Initiative · v3.84-rev5z · 2026-04-30 · Back to dashboard · Methodology · Corporate Law History · References · Legal & litigation · Legal & litigation · How to Cite

References & Further Reading

Source materials supporting the Tracker's analytics, the research panels, and the broader corporate-governance literature on reincorporation, state competition, and Delaware. Bluebook-format where possible; institutional library access may be required for paywalled journal links.

A. Foundational asset-pricing and event-study methodology

Underlies the per-firm event-study modals (synthetic control, market model, FFC6, Patell-z, BHAR). Citations provided in Bluebook 21st ed. format per the SMU CGI Source & Citation Protocol v1.0.

William F. Sharpe, A Simplified Model for Portfolio Analysis, 9 MGMT. SCI. 277 (1963). [DOI]
Eugene F. Fama, Lawrence Fisher, Michael C. Jensen & Richard Roll, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 INT'L ECON. REV. 1 (1969). [DOI]
Stephen J. Brown & Jerold B. Warner, Measuring Security Price Performance, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 205 (1980). [DOI]
Stephen J. Brown & Jerold B. Warner, Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1985). [DOI]
A. Craig MacKinlay, Event Studies in Economics and Finance, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 13 (1997). [JSTOR]
James M. Patell, Corporate Forecasts of Earnings Per Share and Stock Price Behavior, 14 J. ACCT. RES. 246 (1976). [DOI]
Ekkehart Boehmer, Jim Musumeci & Annette B. Poulsen, Event-Study Methodology Under Conditions of Event-Induced Variance, 30 J. FIN. ECON. 253 (1991). [DOI]
Charles J. Corrado, A Nonparametric Test for Abnormal Security-Price Performance in Event Studies, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 385 (1989). [DOI]
Charles J. Corrado, Event Studies: A Methodology Review, 51 ACCT. & FIN. 207 (2011). [DOI]
Arnold R. Cowan, Nonparametric Event Study Tests, 2 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 343 (1992). [Springer]
Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns, 47 J. FIN. 427 (1992). [DOI]
Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds, 33 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1993). [DOI]
Narasimhan Jegadeesh & Sheridan Titman, Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers, 48 J. FIN. 65 (1993). [DOI]
Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57 (1997). [DOI]
Eugene F. Fama, Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, and Behavioral Finance, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 283 (1998). [DOI]
Brad M. Barber & John D. Lyon, Detecting Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 341 (1997). [DOI]
S.P. Kothari & Jerold B. Warner, Measuring Long-Horizon Security Price Performance, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 301 (1997). [DOI]
John D. Lyon, Brad M. Barber & Chih-Ling Tsai, Improved Methods for Tests of Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns, 54 J. FIN. 165 (1999). [DOI]
Mark L. Mitchell & Erik Stafford, Managerial Decisions and Long-Term Stock Price Performance, 73 J. BUS. 287 (2000). [DOI]
Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, A Five-Factor Asset Pricing Model, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2015). [DOI]
S.P. Kothari & Jerold B. Warner, Econometrics of Event Studies, in 1 HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 3 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007). [Publisher]
Alberto Abadie & Javier Gardeazabal, The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 113 (2003). [AEA]
Alberto Abadie, Alexis Diamond & Jens Hainmueller, Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case Studies, 105 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 493 (2010). [DOI]
Alberto Abadie, Using Synthetic Controls: Feasibility, Data Requirements, and Methodological Aspects, 59 J. ECON. LITERATURE 391 (2021). [AEA]
James J. Heckman, Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error, 47 ECONOMETRICA 153 (1979). [DOI]
Yoav Benjamini & Yosef Hochberg, Controlling the False Discovery Rate, 57 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y SERIES B 289 (1995). [JSTOR]
Kenneth R. French, Data Library, Dartmouth College. [French Data Library] — Source for the Fama-French and momentum factor returns used in FFC6 event studies.

B. Corporate-law-relevance scholarship: history, mapping, and post-Rhee literature

Section B is organized as a literature map for readers approaching the DExit episode. Subsections B0 through B5 trace the chronological evolution of corporate-law-relevance scholarship from Berle & Means (1932) through the 2024-2026 DExit moment, then group post-Rhee (2023) work into the four camps now contesting the irrelevance thesis.

B0. Eight-phase chronology of corporate-law-relevance scholarship

A condensed map of the eight scholarly phases the Tracker draws on. Each phase is anchored by one or two canonical works listed in the relevant subsection below. The chronology is reproduced from the SMU CGI Post-Rhee Literature Audit (Apr. 2026, Figure 1).

Phase 1 · Foundation (1932) — Berle & Means establish the separation-of-ownership-and-control problem; corporate law presumed to matter.
Phase 2 · Race-debate (1974-1977) — Cary's race-to-the-bottom critique vs. Winter's race-to-the-top response; Delaware as the case study.
Phase 3 · Planted counter-thesis (1990) — Black's Is Corporate Law Trivial? introduces the proto-irrelevance argument.
Phase 4 · Empirical state-competition era (1985-2004) — Romano, Heron & Lewellen, Daines, Subramanian, Bebchuk & Cohen test whether reincorporation choices and the "Delaware premium" actually move firm value.
Phase 5 · Critique consolidation (2002-2015) — Kahan & Kamar, Bebchuk-Cohen-Ferrell, Anderson & Manns, Bartlett & Partnoy challenge methodology and core empirical claims.
Phase 6 · Nevada segmentation (2012-2018) — Barzuza identifies Nevada as a liability-free segment; Eldar provides the first modern multi-state event study.
Phase 7 · The Rhee irrelevance thesis (2023) — Rhee, The Irrelevance of Delaware Corporate Law, synthesizes the prior critiques and establishes the pre-DExit baseline.
Phase 8 · DExit and the post-Rhee debate (2024-2026) — Bainbridge, Khoo & Tallarita, Hurt, Barzuza, Goshen & Stein, Gramitto Ricci & Sautter, Aneiros, Verstein, and Goodwin contest, refine, or extend the irrelevance thesis against live evidence from Texas SB 29 / SB 1057, Delaware SB 21, Nevada AB 239, and the cohort tracked here.

B1. Foundational lineage (Phases 1-4)

Adolf A. Berle Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (Macmillan 1932; rev. ed. 1968). Phase 1 anchor — separation of ownership and control.
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). [JSTOR] — Race-to-the-bottom thesis.
Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). [JSTOR] — Race-to-the-top response.
Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542 (1990). Phase 3 anchor — the planted proto-irrelevance counter-thesis Rhee 2023 builds on.
Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: Unhealthy Competition versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 259 (1980). [DOI] — Earliest canonical reincorporation event study.
Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985). [JSTOR] — Foundational state-competition framework.
Jeffrey M. Netter & Annette B. Poulsen, State Corporation Laws and Shareholders: The Recent Experience, 18 FIN. MGMT. 29 (1989). [JSTOR]
Randall A. Heron & Wilbur G. Lewellen, An Empirical Analysis of the Reincorporation Decision, 33 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 549 (1998). [DOI]
Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001). [DOI] — The original Delaware-premium paper.
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383 (2003). [DOI]
Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004). [DOI] — Principal critique of the Delaware premium.
Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II — Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 380 (2002). [Open PDF]

B2. Critique consolidation (Phase 5)

Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002). Strongest pre-Rhee competition-is-weak piece; cited by Bainbridge 2024 alongside Bebchuk-Hamdani.
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1775 (2002). Foundational empirical critique of Daines 2001 using Tobin's Q methodology.
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1999). [JSTOR]
Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009). [DOI] — Entrenchment index; widely cited in governance event studies.
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1997 (2014).
Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey Manns, The Delaware Delusion, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1049 (2015). Rhee 2023's most-cited single secondary source (8+ citations); critical pre-Rhee anchor.
Robert Anderson IV, The Delaware Trap: An Empirical Analysis of Incorporation Decisions, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 657 (2018). [SSRN] — Companion empirical to Anderson & Manns 2015.
Robert P. Bartlett III & Frank Partnoy, The Misuse of Tobin's Q, 73 VAND. L. REV. 353 (2020). Methodological centerpiece used by Rhee 2023.

B3. Nevada segmentation and modern multi-state event studies (Phase 6)

Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935 (2012). Origin of the segmentation thesis; sets up Eldar 2018 and Barzuza 2024.
Ofer Eldar, Can Lax Corporate Law Increase Shareholder Value? Evidence from Nevada, 61 J.L. & ECON. 555 (2018). [Chicago Unbound] — Closest pre-DExit analogue for the Tracker's TX/NV/DE event-study design.

B4. The Rhee irrelevance thesis (Phase 7) and DExit-era empirical contradictions

Robert J. Rhee, The Irrelevance of Delaware Corporate Law, 48 J. CORP. L. 295 (2023). [Open PDF] — Phase 7 anchor; pre-DExit irrelevance baseline against which the Tracker's null cohort result (mean −0.22%, p = 0.60) is structurally consistent.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, DExit Drivers: Is Delaware's Dominance Threatened?, 50 J. CORP. L. 823 (2025). [Open PDF] · [SSRN] — Camp 1 confirmatory; hand-collected DE-out reincorporations 2012-June 2024.
Kenneth Khoo & Roberto Tallarita, The Price of Delaware Corporate Law Reform, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 4, 2025). [HLS Forum] · [SSRN 5318203] — Camp 2 strongest post-Rhee event study contradicting irrelevance: −1.4% AR / ~$700B market-cap loss around the SB 21 announcement (Feb. 18, 2025); cohort engagement uses an anticipation/priced-in framing under weak-form market efficiency.
Jessica Erickson, A.C. Pritchard & Stephen J. Choi, Is Delaware Different? Stockholder Lawyering in the Court of Chancery (SSRN Working Paper No. 5748607, 2025). [SSRN] — Camp 2 indirect contradictory; recommends multiplier caps on Chancery plaintiffs' fees.

B5. SB 21, three-state doctrinal analysis, and institutional reform (Phase 8)

Stephen M. Bainbridge, Delaware Senate Bill 21: What It Does and What Questions Remain Open (SSRN Working Paper No. 5243857, 2025). [SSRN] — Comprehensive SB 21 statutory analysis: new controlling-stockholder definition, revised Kahn v. MFW cleansing standards, and books-and-records reform.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Course Correction for Controlling Shareholder Transactions, 49 DEL. J. CORP. L. 525 (2025). [SSRN] — The pre-SB-21 doctrinal prescription Bainbridge himself identifies as the article SB 21 codifies.
Christine Hurt, Texas, Delaware, and the New Controller Primacy, 67 ARIZ. L. REV. 693 (2025). [SSRN] · [Ariz. L. Rev.] — Camp 3 doctrinal; central TX/DE/NV exhibits underpin the Legal page.
Michal Barzuza, Nevada v. Delaware: The New Market for Corporate Law (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 761/2024). [SSRN] — Most thorough doctrinal counter-frame to Rhee on the Nevada side; Nevada plaintiffs barred from books-and-records access required to plead intentional wrongdoing.
Angela N. Aneiros, Reincorporation: The Trojan Horse of Self-Dealing, 77 BAYLOR L. REV. 67 (2025). [SSRN] — Camp 3 doctrinal; entire-fairness-for-all-controlled-reincorporations prescription rejected by Del. Sup. Ct. in Maffei v. Palkon (Feb. 4, 2025) BJR holding.
Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci & Christina M. Sautter, Corporate Disenfranchisement, U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2027) (SSRN Working Paper No. 6280419, 2026). [SSRN] — Camp 3 disenfranchisement; Leopard Paradigm; primary rebuttal target for Read the Fine Print.
Zohar Goshen & Tomer S. Stein, Leaving Delaware? The Essential Role of Specialized Corporate Courts, 125 COLUM. L. REV. 2077 (2025). [Colum. L. Rev.] · [SSRN] — Camp 4 institutional reform; specialized-court framework comparing DE Chancery / TX Business Court / NV. Stein is at the University of Tennessee. Companion to Goodwin's Texas Two-Step.
Andrew Verstein, The Corporate Census (SSRN Working Paper No. 5154952, 2026). [SSRN] · [HLS Forum companion] — Camp 1 counter-anchor; Delaware experienced 30% MORE incorporations in 2025 than in 2024; Florida is the dark horse.
Shane Goodwin, The Texas Two-Step: Rewriting the Rules in the Battle for Corporate Domicile, 53 SEC. REG. L.J., no. 4, Winter 2025, at 1. Camp 4 institutional; SB 29 / SB 1057 framework analysis; companion to Goshen & Stein 2025.
Carliss N. Chatman, The New Corporate Geography, ___ SMU L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2026). [SMU L. Rev.]
Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance. [corpgov.law.harvard.edu] — Open-access governance commentary; companion to the Columbia Law Review Blue Sky Blog.
The CLS Blue Sky Blog (Columbia). [clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu]
SMU Cox Hilltop Forum on Capital Markets. [SMU Cox]

C. Texas corporate-law reform: SB 29, SB 1057, and TBOC

Tex. S.B. 29, 89th Leg., R.S. (2025). [TX Legislature] — Derivative-action 3% threshold; effective May 14, 2025.
Tex. S.B. 1057, 89th Leg., R.S. (2025). [TX Legislature] — Shareholder-proposal threshold; effective Sept. 1, 2025.
Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 21.552 (West 2025) — derivative-action threshold.
Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 21.373 (West 2025) — shareholder-proposal threshold.
Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code (full code). [TBOC ch. 21]
Byron F. Egan, Egan on Entities: Corporations, Partnerships, and Limited Liability Companies in Texas (5th ed. 2025). Definitive Texas-entities practitioner treatise.
Latham & Watkins, A New Era of Corporate Law in Texas (Sept. 2025). [Latham]
Gibson Dunn, 2025 Amendments to the Texas Corporate Statute — Reference Guide. [Gibson Dunn]
Jackson Walker, Heightened Requirements for Shareholder Proposals — TBOC §21.373. [Jackson Walker]
Vinson & Elkins, V&E Insights — Texas governance reforms. [V&E]
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Texas Corporate Law Update — SB 29 and the New Derivative-Suit Threshold. [Wachtell]
Baker Botts, Texas Raises the Bar on Shareholder Proposals (Sept. 2025). [Baker Botts]

D. Court opinions and litigation

Tornetta v. Musk (Tornetta I), 310 A.3d 430 (Del. Ch. 2024), 2024 WL 382424. [Del. Ch. via CourtListener] · [Casetext]. Reaffirmed on motion to revise, Tornetta v. Musk (Tornetta II), 326 A.3d 1203 (Del. Ch. 2024), 2024 WL 4930635 (rejecting post-trial stockholder ratification defense; awarding $345M fee). Aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. In re Tesla, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 2025 WL 3689114 (Del. Dec. 19, 2025) (per curiam) (rescission reversed and 2018 plan reinstated; $1 nominal damages; fee reduced to ~$54.5M on quantum meruit basis; Court took a narrower remedy-only path and declined to reach Chancery's underlying liability holdings). [Del. Sup. Ct. via Justia] — Catalyst opinion that triggered the Tesla, Inc. (TSLA) DE→TX move; Chancery liability holdings remain standing without Supreme Court endorsement.
In re Match Group, Inc. Derivative Litig., 315 A.3d 446 (Del. 2024). [Del. Sup. Ct.]
In re Mindbody, Inc. S'holder Litig., 332 A.3d 349 (Del. 2024). [Del. Sup. Ct.]
Maffei v. Palkon, 339 A.3d 705 (Del. 2025) (en banc), 2025 WL 384054 (Feb. 4, 2025) (Liberty TripAdvisor / Tripadvisor Nevada redomiciliation litigation; "clear day" BJR holding). [Del. Sup. Ct. via Justia]
Gusinsky v. Reynolds, No. 3:25-CV-1816-K (N.D. Tex. 2026). [CourtListener] — Judicial confirmation of LUV §21.552 bylaw amendment enforceability.
Texas Business Court — Office of Court Administration. [TX Business Court]
CourtListener — free federal & Delaware Chancery opinion full text. [CourtListener]

E. Federal securities law and SEC guidance

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a). [SEC PDF]
Rule 14a-8 (shareholder proposals), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8. [eCFR]
Sullivan & Cromwell, SEC Chair Highlights Paths for Companies to Exclude Shareholder Proposals (Oct. 2025). [S&C] — Discusses §21.373 / Rule 14a-8(i)(1) interaction.
SEC EDGAR full-text search. [EDGAR]

F. Open data sources, SSRN, and protocol

SSRN — most working papers and pre-prints in this list are also available on SSRN. [SSRN]
Council of Institutional Investors. [CII] — Tenure and governance trend data.
ProxyMonitor (Manhattan Institute). [ProxyMonitor] — Shareholder-proposal trend data.
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Working Papers. [ECGI]
SMU CGI Source Retrieval & Citation Protocol v1.0 (Bluebook 21st ed.). [Protocol PDF] — Internal standard governing all citations on this Tracker.

G. Practitioner sources & advisory commentary on DExit, SB 21, SB 29, SB 1057, and AB 239

Proxy advisor and law-firm memos that the Tracker uses for cross-checking firm classifications, voting policy, and statutory comparison. Not peer-reviewed; load-bearing factual claims are independently verified against primary EDGAR filings and published court opinions.

Glass Lewis Research, The State of US Reincorporation in 2025: The Growing Threat and Reality of "DEXIT" (Oct. 9, 2025). [Glass Lewis] — Headline 2025 proxy-season figures: 29 proposals (+70.6% YoY); 18 of 28 voted (64.3%) sought to leave Delaware; 13 to NV / 2 to TX; 55% from controlled-shareholder firms; 81.1% average support.
Garrett Muzikowski, Andrea Hearon & Pat Tucker, DExit: So You Want to Leave Delaware? What To Consider Beyond the Legalese, FTI Consulting (Apr. 5, 2026). [HLS Forum] · [FTI] — Eight-point board framework + ISS / Glass Lewis / Big-3 voting-policy summary.
A&O Shearman M&A and Corporate Governance Group, Is DExit Real? (Jan. 29, 2026). [HLS Forum] — Three-state tradeoff analysis; Nevada migration roster (TripAdvisor, Dropbox, Roblox, AMC Networks, MSG Sports, MSG Entertainment, Sphere, Trade Desk, Pershing Square, Tempus AI, XOMA, FNF, Affirm).
A&O Shearman, 2025 Corporate Governance & Executive Compensation Survey (Dec. 15, 2025). [A&O Shearman] — 23rd-edition annual survey; new chapter on the DE/TX/NV jurisdictional landscape and the practical DExit option.
A&O Shearman, ExxonMobil Proposes Reincorporation to Texas amid Growing Corporate Migration (Apr. 2026). [A&O Shearman] — Frames XOM as recognition of Texas as a corporate jurisdiction in its own right rather than mere DExit alternative; useful pivot for the Read the Fine Print framing.
Matthew A. Schwartz, William S.L. Weinberg & Brian T. Frawley, Summary of Recent Changes to Delaware, Nevada and Texas Corporate Law, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (July 5, 2025). [HLS Forum] · [S&C PDF] — Three-state side-by-side. Correctly attributed to Sullivan & Cromwell (sometimes mistakenly cited to Wachtell).
Alston & Bird Financial Services and Securities Litigation Teams, Corporate Courtship: Delaware, Texas & Nevada Enact Reforms to Attract Incorporations (Jan. 6, 2026). [Alston & Bird] — Three-state side-by-side covering DE SB 21 reforms to DGCL §§ 144 and 220; TX SB 29 BJR codification and TBOC § 21.552 derivative threshold; NV AB 239 jury-trial waiver and controlling-stockholder fiduciary clarification (effective May 30, 2025). Most current of the three-state memos.
Gaurav Jetley & Nicholas Mulford, DExit: Reincorporation Data Seem to Support the Hype, Analysis Group (Sept. 23, 2025). [HLS Forum] — Net loss of 11 large public firms over 18 months; 63% of departures are controlled companies under SB 21's threshold.
Gaurav Jetley & Nicholas Mulford, DExit Trends: Tracking Reincorporations Away from Delaware, Analysis Group (Feb. 19, 2026). [Analysis Group] — Updated through Q2 2025; 75% IPO share statistic.
J. Scott Enright, Is the Reincorporation of Public Companies Away From Delaware (DEXIT) a Thing?, Taft Law (Feb. 25, 2026). [Taft Law] — DExit-overblown framing: less than 1% of all U.S. public companies have moved.
Courtney Tygesson, Kealan Santistevan & Lisa Cossi, Reincorporation Considerations for Late-Stage Private and Pre-IPO Companies, Cooley LLP (July 3, 2025). [HLS Forum] — Pre-IPO bar perspective on jurisdictional choice.
Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci & Christina M. Sautter, Exxon Texas Move Should Prompt Shareholders to Read Fine Print, Bloomberg Law (Mar. 19, 2026). [Bloomberg Law] — Companion op-ed to the Cornell L. Rev. and forthcoming UC Irvine L. Rev. articles.
Joel Friedlander, Are Hamermesh, Chandler and Strine making Delaware corporate law great again?, DEL. NEWS J. (Mar. 17, 2025). [Yahoo / Del. News J.] — SB 21 as political-capture critique from a senior plaintiff-side practitioner; the strongest publicly available SB-21-as-political-capture piece.
Benjamin Edwards (UNLV), Reincorporation Updates (monthly series), Business Law Prof Blog (2024-2026). [Business Law Prof Blog] — Best public reincorporation tracker; useful for cross-checking EDGAR completeness against the Tracker's coverage list.

Note on access. Many of the above journals (e.g., J. Fin. Econ., J. Fin., Rev. Fin. Stud.) are paywalled but available through institutional libraries and SSRN pre-prints. The DOI / [Publisher] links resolve to the paywalled page; the SSRN link resolves to the open-access pre-print where one exists. Per the SMU CGI Source & Citation Protocol §1.2, retrieval order is SSRN → institutional repository → journal site → HLS Forum / CLS Blue Sky → Google Scholar → HeinOnline.

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