The Trade Desk, Inc. (TTD) — Reincorporation detail

Why this firm matters

Mid-to-large-cap firm ($10.6B) with sufficient market depth for reliable event-study identification.

Controller & ownership

Diffuse / non-controlledFounder Significant Minority

Jeffrey Green (CEO/Founder, via Class B 10:1 supervoting — sub-50%) holds approximately 48.4% of voting power. No single holder reaches the controlled-company threshold (>50% of voting power).

Source: TTD 2025 DEF 14A (Sept 16, 2025 special meeting, accession 0001193125-25-164411, p.24) — Jeff T. Green beneficially owns 4,754,752 Class A shares + 42,239,186 Class B shares (97.6% of Class B, NOT 100%); 446,622,494 Class A + 43,275,936 Class B outstanding; Class B carries 10 votes/share; combined voting power 427,146,612 / 879,381,854 = 48.4%. Founder/CEO/Chairman but sub-50% — NOT a controlled company under NYSE Rule 303A.00. Tracker's prior 49.2% figure baked an incorrect assumption that Green held 100% of Class B; actual is 97.6%. Corrected 2026-05-19 via Tier-3 overnight reviewer dispatch + Tier-2 primary-source verification (also flipped controlled flag 1→0 to match strict listing-rule definition; pending rev66 schema split for founder-dominant-sub-50% bucket).

Vote outcome — reincorporation proposal

Approval standard: majority of the voting power of the outstanding stock entitled to vote (DGCL §266 conversion). Meeting type: annual.

Vote totals not yet pulled. Awaiting EDGAR Item 5.07.

Visual evidence — event study around the announcement

Per-firm event-study figures auto-built from event_study_announcement_json in the master database. Each panel is generated deterministically from the same data backing the cohort statistics — no firm-specific tuning, no cherry-picking.

The Trade Desk's announcement-day move was a non-event

**Bottom line.** All four ways of looking at The Trade Desk's stock that day point to roughly the same answer: barely moved by about 0.3%, and the move was statistically indistinguishable from a normal trading day (p = 0.92).

This chart shows four different statistical lenses on what The Trade Desk's stock did on the day the reincorporation was announced. Each lens compares the actual move against a different prediction of what "normal" should have looked like — peer firms, the broader market, a single matched competitor, or a raw side-by-side. The gold-edged bar marks the lens used in the cohort summary.

Method

Specifications: synthetic control on a sector peer pool, single-factor market model (S&P 500 benchmark), matched pair against a pre-specified primary peer, and raw differential. Estimation window: 240 trading days ending the day before the announcement. Standard errors via Patell-z (1976).

For The Trade Desk, the announcement-day move sat right inside its normal noise

**Bottom line.** The Trade Desk's announcement-day reading falls near the center of its day-to-day trading range over the prior year. Translation: this looked like a typical day for the stock, statistically speaking.

This histogram shows every daily move The Trade Desk's stock made over the 240 trading days *before* the announcement. The red line marks the announcement-day reading. If that line sits in the body of the distribution, the announcement barely registered as unusual for this particular stock.

Method

Daily abnormal returns from the headline specification's pre-announcement fit, with a normal-distribution overlay and Shapiro-Wilk normality test on the residuals.

The Trade Desk sits near the middle of the 36-firm cohort

**Bottom line.** The Trade Desk's announcement-day reading is close to the cohort-wide mean of +0.69%. Most firms in this cohort moved by similar small amounts; reactions are firm-specific, not regime-specific.

This chart shows every firm in the cohort that has a computed announcement-day abnormal return — sorted from largest negative to largest positive. The Trade Desk is highlighted in gold. The dashed line marks the cohort-wide average, which is essentially zero. Even firms in the same destination state and same statutory regime can have very different reactions.

Method

Same headline-specification methodology applied to every firm in the 36-firm cohort that has 240 trading days of pre-announcement price history.

Data integrity. All figures generated by the same script (perfirm_gallery.py) on every release; SHA-256 verified at deploy time. See also: Cohort-wide event study →.

Event-study abnormal returns — announcement window

Returns around the announcement date.

Event date: 2024-09-20 · Estimation window: 2023-10-06 to 2024-09-19 (240 days)

Specification	Day-0 AR	Inference
Synthetic control (9-donor Information Technology peer pool)i	+0.27%	no inference
Market model (SPY benchmark)i	-0.23%	Patell-z p-value = 0.932
Sector-augmented model (SPY + Nasdaq-100 (QQQ)) HEADLINEi	-0.27%	Patell-z p-value = 0.919
Matched pair (vs EA, market-model-adjusted)i	+0.49%	two-sided p-value = 0.864
Raw differential vs EAi	+0.27%	no inference

Robustness checks — does the headline result hold up?

Three independent diagnostics that interrogate the headline estimate from different angles. All three pointing the same way = high confidence in the result.

Pre-event drift check: the firm's daily abnormal return drifted by +0.0021% per day in the pre-event window (p = 0.467). no detectable pre-event drift ✓. — A near-zero slope means the pre-event period was stable, so the day-0 reaction is not contamination from a pre-existing trend.
Donor co-movement check: 7 of 9 peer firms moved in the same direction as the treated firm on the event day (binomial p = 0.1797). — A high concordance means the day was driven by industry-wide news rather than something firm-specific. A low concordance means the firm moved differently from peers (potential firm-specific signal).
Synthetic-control fit quality: pre-event correlation between the firm and its synthetic twin = 0.601 (modest tracking); R² = -1.524 (fraction of pre-event variance explained); Durbin-Watson = 2.05 (no autocorrelation). — Higher correlation + higher R² + Durbin-Watson near 2 means the synthetic peer was a good match before the event, so the post-event gap is interpretable.

Event-study abnormal returns — vote window

Returns around the shareholder-vote (or written-consent) date.

Event date: 2024-11-14 · T0 source: actual_effective_date_iso · Estimation window: trailing 240 days; 240 valid after NaN drop

Specification	Day-0 AR	Inference
Market model (SPY benchmark) HEADLINEi	-0.11%	Patell-z p-value = 0.961

Long-run abnormal returns & pooled estimates

Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (1 / 3 / 6 / 12 months) and calendar-time portfolio alpha (CTE) post-effective.

Effective date: 2024-11-14 · n_post = 363 days

Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR)

Horizon & benchmark	BHAR	Inference
1 month vs S&P 500	+3.11%	Patell-z = +0.22 · p = 0.829 · n = 21 days
1 month vs sector ETF (XLK)	+2.43%	Patell-z = +0.22 · p = 0.829 · n = 21 days
3 months vs S&P 500	-42.68% ^***	Patell-z = -2.53 · p = 0.011 · n = 63 days
3 months vs sector ETF (XLK)	-42.46% ^***	Patell-z = -2.53 · p = 0.011 · n = 63 days
6 months vs S&P 500	-39.34%	Patell-z = -1.49 · p = 0.135 · n = 126 days
6 months vs sector ETF (XLK)	-38.75%	Patell-z = -1.49 · p = 0.135 · n = 126 days
12 months vs S&P 500	-80.45% ^***	Patell-z = -2.92 · p = 0.004 · n = 252 days
12 months vs sector ETF (XLK)	-87.58% ^***	Patell-z = -2.92 · p = 0.004 · n = 252 days

Calendar-time portfolio alpha (CTE)

Specification	Annualized alpha	Inference
Calendar-time portfolio alpha vs S&P 500	-74.52%/yr ^***	t = -2.29 · p = 0.022 · n = 363 days · Newey-West HAC SE (lag=5)
Calendar-time portfolio alpha vs sector ETF	-74.59%/yr ^***	t = -2.32 · p = 0.020 · n = 363 days · Newey-West HAC SE (lag=5)

Cohort-level robustness battery

Heckman selection-corrected ATE · Romano-Wolf step-down + BH FDR · pooled BHAR. This firm's reading is shown in context of the full cohort.

Heckman two-step selection correction (controlled-vs-widely-held)

Cohort ATE = +0.94% (SE = 7.06%, n = 2395) after correcting for controller-status selection (inverse Mills ratio = -0.062).

Romano-Wolf step-down + Benjamini-Hochberg FDR (n = 47)

This firm: raw p = 0.919, Romano-Wolf adjusted p = 1.000, BH-FDR adjusted p = 0.966. Multiple-hypothesis correction is computed across the full cohort to control family-wise error rate at alpha = 0.05.

Pooled cohort BHAR (mover firms only)

BHAR_63d: mean = -5.60% (SE = 22.11%, n = 3, p = 0.499) · BHAR_126d: mean = +17.33% (SE = 41.17%, n = 3, p = 0.774)

See Cohort event study → for the full battery and forest plots.

Source filings

Primary-source documents on SEC EDGAR plus IR / search links.

Classification & audit trail

Bucket

A

Panel eligibility

PRE_SB29_BENCHMARK

Audit status

NEEDS_ACCESSION

Source confidence

VERIFIED_EFFECTIVE

Transaction status

COMPLETED

Audit notes

[2026-04-28] Phase 4I: replaced Google-search IR fallback with direct URL https://investors.thetradedesk.com/
[2026-04-28] Phase 4K: corrected vote date (was 2024-09-26, actually 2024-11-14 Special Meeting). Trade Desk Delaware Chancery refused to require supermajority — second-most-cited legal precedent after Palkon v. Maffei. is_legal_precedent=1; treat with heavy annotation.
[2026-04-28] Phase 4N: synthesized event_study_announcement_json from existing scalar CAR cells (phase4a_v2 join). Reviewer can extend with multi-spec analysis. [2026-04-28] phase5c: vote source 8-K 0001193125-24-260382 (2024-11-18, Δ=4d) applied from EDGAR pull (status=AUTO_RESOLVED) [ORIGINAL_ACCESSION_FIELD_TEXT] DEF 14A Oct 3, 2024 (special meeting Nov 14, 2024; DE->NV) [2026-04-28] phase5e: no canonical accession found in raw value 'DEF 14A Oct 3, 2024 (special meeting Nov 14, 2024; DE->NV)'; original narrative moved to audit_notes; edgar_accession_canonical cleared and audit_status flagged NEEDS_ACCESSION for manual EDGAR pull [2026-04-28] phase5c: vote source 8-K 0001193125-24-260382 (2024-11-18, Δ=4d) applied from EDGAR pull (status=AUTO_RESOLVED) [2026-04-29] phase5r: bucket 'B1' -> 'A' (DE->NV effective 2024-11-14 < SB29 (2025-05-14) -> bucket A (pre-SB29)) [2026-04-29] phase5w: comprehensive validation by external reviewer across tranches v4 (4-version full residual walk, 269 substantive answers across 52 firms, 0 bucket drifts vs v3.58)
[2026-04-29] v3.75: VERIFIED — DGCL §266 conversion mechanism. Per Dechert/Fried Frank/Harvard Forum: Gunderson v. Trade Desk (Del. Ch. Nov 2024) RULED that the charter's supermajority amendment threshold was INAPPLICABLE to Nevada conversion under §266; only DGCL-statutory majority-of-outstanding-voting-power was required. Special meeting Nov 14, 2024.
v3.84-rev2 MODERATE date correction: announcement_date_iso changed from 2024-09-20 to 2024-10-03. The September 2024 date was the board approval / press-release date, not the first SEC-filed disclosure. The DEF 14A filing on October 3, 2024 is the canonical first-SEC-disclosure date per protocol. PRE 14A verification still pending; correct to October 3 unless an earlier qualifying filing is found.
v3.84-rev5 [2026-04-30] cell-audit reconciliation verified: DEF 14A filing date (first proxy disclosure) (source_type=DEF14A, quality=HIGH).