⊘ WITHDRAWN — Tracked Historically  ·  MercadoLibre's DE→TX redomestication proposal was withdrawn per DEFA14A 0001999371-25-007474 (June 9, 2025). This page retains the firm's record for historical reference only. Not an active redomicile cohort case.  audit framework

The coalition · [DATA PENDING — verify against most recent 13D/G + Beneficial Ownership] dynamic + institutional thresholds

A [DATA PENDING — verify against most recent 13D/G + Beneficial Ownership] and the Texas threshold math.

Bottom line. MercadoLibre's ownership structure is unusual in the SB-29-era-mover cohort: the top individual holder owns [DATA PENDING]% economically and approximately 22% of voting power. MercadoLibre is not a "controlled company" under NASDAQ Rule 5615(c) or under Texas SB 21's controlled-issuer definition, but the [DATA PENDING — verify against most recent 13D/G + Beneficial Ownership] character is central to the post-SB-29 governance narrative. For Texas's elective opt-in thresholds (§21.552(a)(3) 3% derivative standing; §21.373 $1M shareholder-proposal threshold), the institutional-coalition arithmetic is reported below — pending the 13F-family ownership snapshot for MercadoLibre as of the canonical pre-event date.

The [DATA PENDING — verify against most recent 13D/G + Beneficial Ownership] dynamic

Ownership snapshot (S&P Capital IQ as of 2026-04-25)

  • [DATA PENDING] — largest individual holder: [DATA PENDING]% economic stake; approximately 22% of voting power. Controller type: founder / CEO.
  • Insiders aggregate: 24.95% (MercadoLibre's filings disclose officers and directors aggregated).
  • ≥5% individual holder list: [DATA PENDING] ([DATA PENDING]).
  • Is MercadoLibre a "controlled company"? No — the top voting shareholder's stake falls below the 50% threshold under NASDAQ Rule 5615(c) and Texas SB 21's controlled-issuer definition. The firm's voting concentration is that the post-SB-29 narrative treats as load-bearing.

The [DATA PENDING — verify against most recent 13D/G + Beneficial Ownership] dynamic creates a power asymmetry standard event-study identification doesn't directly model: the marginal trader does not fully set price when a [DATA PENDING — verify against most recent 13D/G + Beneficial Ownership] could credibly deliver a discontinuous corporate action (e.g., another redomiciliation, a take-private, a special dividend). The /stress_tests page documents how this asymmetry interacts with the Day-0 abnormal-return tests.

The institutional coalition — pending 13F snapshot

Pending verification — 13F-family ownership snapshot for MercadoLibre

The coalition arithmetic below requires the canonical 13F-family ownership snapshot (S&P Capital IQ Public Ownership Detailed) as of MercadoLibre's pre-event date. Pending that snapshot, the standard fields are shown with [DATA PENDING] placeholders.

Measure MercadoLibre value
Total 13F-family filers in the universe[DATA PENDING]
Filers individually exceeding the §21.373 $1M threshold[DATA PENDING]
Two-holder combinations clearing the §21.552(a)(3) 3% derivative threshold[DATA PENDING]
Vanguard + BlackRock + State Street combined %[DATA PENDING]
Position-date breakdown[DATA PENDING]
Top voting shareholder stake[DATA PENDING]% (largest voting holder)

The "do thresholds matter for MercadoLibre?" question

Two conditions independently matter: (1) has MercadoLibre opted into SB 29 / SB 1057 thresholds (see /statutes)? (2) If MercadoLibre has opted in, can the institutional coalition clear the thresholds? Both conditions resolve before the coalition-arithmetic argument carries weight. In the cross-firm cohort, the XOM canonical demonstrates the pattern: even where a firm opts into the 3% derivative threshold, the existing institutional shareholder base can clear it via two-holder coalitions. MercadoLibre's coalition math will follow the same procedure once the 13F snapshot is pulled.

The [DATA PENDING — verify against most recent 13D/G + Beneficial Ownership] dynamic complicates the coalition analysis in a way that XOM's diffuse-shareholder profile did not: Top-holder concentration ~[DATA PENDING — voting %] voting power is not a coalition member; it is a counterweight to coalitions. The cross-firm placebo on /evidence reports how MercadoLibre ranks among the 21-firm placebo distribution; the comparator is informative even before the per-firm event-study runs.

Primary sources

Ownership data

  • S&P Capital IQ Public Ownership Detailed (proprietary; snapshot dated 2026-04-25) — ticker MELI
  • MercadoLibre DEF 14A 2024 — Beneficial Ownership table
  • MercadoLibre 13D/G filings on EDGAR

Full Bluebook-format citations in SOURCES.md.